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AGAINST (CONSTITUTIONAL)
SETTLEMENT
OUR UNSETILED CONSTITUTION: A NEW
AND
DEFENSE
OF
CONSTITUTIONALISM
JUDICIAL REVIEW. Louis Michael Seidman. 1 Yale
University Press. 2001. Pp. 260. $35.00.
Brannon P. Denninl
A decade ago, Glenn Reynolds published a brief essay in
which he invited scholars to view the activity of the Supreme
Court through the lens of the then-emerging science of Chaos
Theory. 3 Reynolds argued that students of the Court might learn
from Chaos Theory's insight that seemingly random and unpredictable phenomena actually masked order, predictability, and
stability. "Like the drop on the end of its faucet," Reynolds
wrote, "a legal principle tends to expand to its logical limits, and
then break off, to be replaced by a new one. " 4 But "unlike scientists, who have learned better," legal scholars were still at work
generating foundational theories to predict how and when this
process takes place. 5 That these efforts at prediction had failed
was of no surprise to Reynolds- especially as those theories attempted to predict the behavior of the U.S. Supreme Court. The
Court's multi-member nature, its control over its docket, its relative lack of constraint in resolving issues before it, and the effects
of politics on the Court make it particularly unpredictable.6 For
Reynolds, it all added up to the conclusion that the Court was
unlikely to "ever reach a truly 'final' answer to very many questions that come before it, though most theories of constitutional
I.

Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
Associate Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law at Samford University.
I thank Barry Friedman, Ted Ruger, Rob Pearigen, John Vile, Howard Walthall, and
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3. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Chaos and the Coun, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 110 (1991).
4. Id at 112 (footnote omitted).
5. Id at 112, 113.
6. See id at 114.
2.
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interpretation seem grounded in the assumption that such answers exist." 7
Then Reynolds asked whether this lack of finality wasn't a
benefit of our system, both politically and economically. The political benefit, he argued, stemmed from "the fluidity of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence over time [meant that] no coalition
is set in stone over time, and that people are often pressed to become involved in politics to protect their interests, even when
the judicial system has spoken." 8 Economically, this predictable
unpredictability was important because "the 'chaotic' nature of
the judicial system may mean that stagnation through specialinterest domination is unlikely over the long term, as periodic
shifts by the Supreme Court lead to the periodic need to renegotiate political/economic alliances," which, in turn, result in the
maintenance of political and economic flexibility. 9
Reynolds's doubts about the possibility of final settlements
of contested constitutional issues, and his tentative identification
of benefits to a regime in which those issues were not settlednot even by the U.S. Supreme Court-have much in common
with the theory put forth by Louis Michael Seidman in his new
book, Our Unsettled Constitution. Seidman argues that we are
mistaken to think that the central mission of constitutional law is
to effect settlement of contested political issues. Theories designed around that vision are thus fatally flawed and doomed to
failure, he concludes. Seidman instead suggests that constitutional law exists to unsettle questions that are settled elsewhere
in our political system, providing those who lose in the political
process an opportunity to upset political settlement in the courts.
This judicial safety valve, Seidman contends, offers political losers an incentive to work within the existing political community.
Because judicial unsettlements themselves can become objects
for unsettlement, constitutional law has, and ought to have, an
ephemeral quality that frustrates attempts to settle constitutional
questions for all time.
In the pages that follow, I will summarize both Seidman's
critique of constitutional theory, as currently practiced, as well as
his description and defense of "unsettlement theory." Then I will

7. Id See also Barry Friedman, Dialague and Judicial Review, 91 Mich. L. Rev.
577 (1993) (arguing that little in constitutional law is ever settled, and that this is a good
thing).
8. ld at 115.
9. Id
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highlight some possible problems with Seidman's unsettlement
theory.
I

Seidman acknowledges that we are living "in an age of
growing doubt as to the utility of any normative theory of constitutional law," but he argues that we have to be able to give some
account of how we approach constitutional law, since it is not going away. (pp. 1, 3-5) A would-be theorist's challenge, then, is
"to formulate a general approach to constitutional law that takes
into account the intractable nature of our political disagreements
instead of attempting to suppress them." (p. 7) Seidman's thesis
is that "we can accomplish this task by reversing the two central
assumptions upon which most prior theory has been based: that
principles of constitutional law should be independent of our political commitments and that the role of constitutional law is to
settle political disagreement." (p. 7)
Seidman defines constitutional law as "a system designed to
prevent the polity from deconstituting. It accomplishes this task
by establishing terms of agreement to which all members of the
polity can subscribe (or at least can be expected to subscribe) and
which prevent the polity from disintegrating when confronted
with political disagreement." (p. 19) What this system amounts
to, then, "is a series of metarules or principles that allow people
to abstract from ordinary disagreements," which he terms "the
rules of constitutional settlement." (p. 20) But, he asks, "[h]ow
are these rules to be justified when people disagree"? (p. 22) It
turns out, argues Seidman, that the justification for adhering to
settlement rules in the face of disagreement with outcomes owe
little to the rules themselves, and more to ulterior motives of
those in the political community, such as the desire to preserve
the group, thinking that, in the aggregate, the types of settlement
will benefit one in the long run. (pp. 22-26)
These rules of constitutional settlement have a further problem, though. There is often disagreement as to the substantive
content of those rules and what they require. This means, for
Seidman, that constitutional settlements are bound to fail.
The settlements are supposed to allow us to resolve contested
political disputes by reference to a "higher" set of rules on
which there is agreement. But there is in fact no agreement on
the higher set of rules, and to the extent that the competing
sets of rules are foundational, there is no prospect of formu-
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lating arguments that would (or should) create agreement.
Moreover, even if there were agreement, there is no reason
why people should feel bound to follow the rules in circumstances where those rules produce results that are perceived
as undesirable. (p. 28)

Instead of seeking settlement rules that forestall or shortcircuit potentially divisive political controversies, Seidman argues that constitutional law should provide a forum for those
frustrated by losses in the political system, and offer them an
outlet for their frustration, in an effort to retain losers' loyalty to
the system as a whole. Unsettlement theory allows them toremain within the political community, and, it is hoped, keeps
them in an on-going political dialogue. The goal, writes Seidman,
is to "build a community founded on consent by enticing losers
into a continuing conversation." (pp. 8-9) Underlying unsettlement theory is Seidman's vision for a just community that is inclusive. Exclusion from the community, especially from community dialogue over divisive issues, is to be avoided if at all
possible.
II

But even if actual settlement is impossible, because of the
existence of multiple "settlements" generated by alternative interpretations, constitutional law is, he argues, "inevitable," because when conflict arises it must be settled acc·ording to some
process. "[L]etting things come out the way they come out,"
Seidman writes, is not an attractive option, "[u]nless we are
ready to give up not just on constitutional law but also on all our
political commitments." (p. 33) If there is disagreement, Seidman does not dispute that there will be a settlement, because the
disagreement has to be resolved one way or another. What
Seidman argues, however, is that we are wrong to look to constitutional law to provide those settlements.
Courts should instead embrace the open texture of the law,
and create unsettlement opportunities for political losers.
"[P]oliticians," Seidman writes, "can be counted upon to find a
modus vivendi .... Of course, any resolution that politicians devise will make some people unhappy." (p. 159) But the Court itself should not try to settle disputes through constitutional law
because
displacing a political with a constitutional settlement only
makes the exclusionary problem worse. It is one thing to lose
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a political fight. It is another to be told that the loss is irreversible and foundational. When the Supreme Court uses
constitutional rhetoric to shut down an argument by imposing
one potential settlement rather than another, it is doing something more than announcing the outcome of a political struggle. It is attempting to constitute the community in a fashion
that excludes the losers for reasons that cannot be explained
in a fashion comprehensible to them. (p. 159)

Unsettlement works, he argues, because it "establishes a different sort of neutrality." (p. 202) By emphasizing "the contradictions in constitutional law ... both sides ... can go on using
constitutional rhetoric that appeals to our core commitments"
and "have a reason not to sever their ties with the community."
(p. 202) If scholars and judges could abandon the notion that
constitutional law settled matters, then judicial decisions would
seem "worthy of respect not because they are substantively right
but because they are (or at least can be) grounded in a method
and a culture that encourages uncertainty, ambivalence, and contradiction." (p. 204)
III
Why should it fall to the courts to discharge this unusual
"unsettlement" function? Seidman argues that judges (particularly Supreme Court Justices) occupy a position unique among
our political actors. Their ability to serve as public officials while
retaining much of their privacy allows them to personify the conflicts between public and private, between the particular and the
universal, that Seidman finds at the heart of both political conflicts and constitutional law. Rather than adopting what he sees
as late twentieth century constitutionalism's "unenviable choice
between cynical withdrawal on the one hand and hypocritical,
ineffective posturing on the other," (p. 74) Seidman embraces
the contestable nature of the boundaries of constitutional law.
He argues that it is precisely the lack of fixed boundaries (p. 75)
in constitutional law, and judges' ability to exploit them, that
continues to hold promise for a just community.
Much of contemporary constitutional theory, Seidman
writes, consists of critiques of paired opposites-freedom vs. coercion, local vs. national, feasance vs. nonfeasance, public vs.
private, equality vs. inequality-that characterize much of con-
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stitutional law. 10 He includes critiques of an overarching paired
opposite in constitutional law-law vs. politics. 11 At a micro
level, Seidman argues, the efforts to fix boundaries in constitutional law- usually with reference to the paired opposites described above-replays political communities' efforts to fix
boundaries at a macro level. This effort also involves a choice
between another paired opposite: universalism and particularism. "[T]he unresolved conflict between particularism and universalism," he argues, "helps explain why and how the boundaries of political community remain contested .... It follows that a
contested and uncertain boundary, formed by the unending
struggle between particularist and universalist urges, may be the
best means of ensuring a just peace." (p. 81)
This conflict is one that is played out in constitutionallaw, 12
as well as in other facets of human political life. And while
boundaries must be set, conflicts settled, he writes that "we cannot, and would not want to, finally resolve our conflicting impulses toward particularism and universalism," which means that
"the boundaries between constitutional law's paired opposites
cannot be resolved according to law." (p. 82) So how can one set
(tentative) boundaries and resolve conflict, at least temporarily?
Seidman looks to the one set of political actors who straddle a
unique line between their private and public roles, and whom
one may see as the personification of this tension in life and the
law: judges.
Judges can unsettle, Seidman argues, because they are able
to retain control over their private lives by virtue of their insulation and relative independence. In his words, judges are-and
should be- "separated in some measure from the political outcomes they criticize" in their rulings. (p. 83) Moreover, the
common law method of inductive reasoning reinforces the particularist impulse, even in the rendering of decisions that have
universal implications. If presented with new or different or
changed facts in a different case, the previous case does not necessarily bind, or at least is not immune from alteration. (pp. 8485) For Seidman, this means that judges "will be sensitive to the
10. Seep. 62: "In its classical form, constitutional law privileges private over public,
local over national, freedom over coercion, feasance over nonfeasance, and equality over
inequality."
11. See p. 63: "Law is neutral, nondiscretionary, objective and rational. Politics is
biased, idiosyncratic, subjective, and nonrational. Legislatures engage in politics; courts
enforce the law."
12. See p. 81: "The conflict between the particular and the universal parallels the
linked pairs that ... are central to ordinary constitutional practice."
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contradictory demands of public and private values," which
"helps guarantee a permanently contested boundary between
public and private." (p. 85)
This method and culture could be fostered by judges themselves who would make decisions (the case must, eventually, be
decided), but who would also recognize the impossibility of
"neutrality" and thus be less inclined even to attempt permanent
solutions to perennially contested political matters. A combination of judges' self-awareness of the contestibility of the issues
they decide and the relative political insulation and independence judges enjoy, Seidman argues, would serve to legitimate
their decisions. 13
IV
Seidman acknowledges that while constitutional law harbors
the potential for employing unsettlement theory, that potential
has remained largely unrealized. Seidman argues that American
judges-especially Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court-have
instead insisted that their job is to effect constitutional settlement. This has led judges to promote a view that most of the
public just doesn't buy: that they are no more than disinterested
appliers of "the law" who bravely rush in to settle political controversies based on an impartial application of "the rules" as
they see them. To do otherwise, the argument runs, would be to
move from law into politics, with all sorts of adverse consequences for courts' institutionallegitimacy. 14 Seidman dismisses
this fear as "simply a bugaboo." (p. 92)
In cases involving constitutional structure-separation of
powers cases, for example-making such a frank admission of
the principles' indeterminacy is unlikely to draw the Court's legitimacy into question. Suggestions that the dispute should be
13. He writes:
[A]lthough unsettlement does not mean that courts will invalidate all laws
touching on religion, it does mean that all these laws pose constitutional issues,
and that these issues cannot be resolved by reference to a grand theory that finally works out the conflict. This, too, is what unsettlement means. Moreover,
precisely because the resolution of these issues is unconstrained by theory,judicial decisions will reflect the individual commitments, belief systems, and prejudices of the Justices making them .... Regardless of our views on the merits ...
the decisions gain legitimacy from the fact that they are rendered by actors who
themselves straddle the public and private spheres and can therefore police an
uncertain, shifting, and contested boundary between them. (pp. 207-08)
14. The example that leaps readily to mind-which Seidman uses-is the plurality
opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. (pp. 91-92)
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left to the political process, he notes, are almost incoherent,
since it is that very process that generated the constitutional conflict. (p. 160) Moreover, as he notes at several places, deference
itself is a form of constitutional settlement. (p. 160-61)
As for judicial enforcement of enumerated and unenumerated rights, Seidman urges an
end [to] our obsession with the rhetorical distinction between
activism and restraint and focus instead on the real dispute,
between libertarian and interventionist activists. Both libertarians and interventionists are prepared to substitute judicial
for political judgments. But whereas libertarians favor an active judiciary to keep the political branches passive, interventionists favor an active judiciary to make the political
branches more active. Put differently, whereas libertarians
embrace the private conception of rights that associates freedom with government nonfeasance, interventionists embrace
the public conception that links freedom to government intervention. (pp. 184-85)

In other words, not only is "restraint" simply another form of
settlement, but it can be characterized as another form of activism as well. For Seidman, honesty and transparency demand that
Justices and judges drop posturing in favor of candor. No one
believes that judges are disinterested or that the law is "neutral,"
so why insult the public's intelligence by pretending otherwise?
But how do judges and Justices implement unsettlement
theory? What does an unsettlement decision look like? How
would a judge or Justice write one? Other than to say that judges
ought "to candidly acknowledge that their choice between settlements is politically driven and contestable . . . and that the
choice between structures will ... be determined by politically
controversial preferences for outcomes," Seidman is vague. (p.
159) Further suggestions include those mentioned above: conceding the underdeterminacy of the legal principles employed to
decide constitutional cases; recognizing that delegation to political branches or private decisionmakers is not so much restraint
as simply another attempt at settlement; skepticism of reductionists' resort to paired opposites; and resisting the temptation to
employ bright-line tests over those requiring consideration of the
totality of circumstances, balancing, or the like. (pp. 105-08)
However, while Seidman discusses some Supreme Court
opinions to show how their reasoning is vulnerable to unsettlement, (e.g., pp. 125-34) he never takes the next step. He never
offers an example of an opinion that strikes the proper balance
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between the need to decide a case, and the need to avoid the
temptation to create settlement rules for the constitutional issue
involved. As I describe in more detail below, I think that this
lack of concern with the ability of courts to implement his theory
is an unfortunate omission that diminishes its ultimate utility.

v
Seidman has written a complex, challenging book; my summary of his argument is of necessity an oversimplification. While
there can be no question whether Seidman has contributed significantly to the debate over constitutionalism, judicial review,
and the proper role of the judiciary, elements of his theory are
(forgive me) unsettling.
While Seidman did not set out to write a philosophical treatise on the creation of a just political community, I did find myself wishing for more description on his part of what his criteria
for a "just community" were. Seidman only describes oneinclusiveness-which is the one criterion most relevant to his unsettlement theory. But his goal of inclusiveness highlights another gap in Seidman's argument. He never offers an explicit defense of his position that inclusiveness ought to be constitutional
law's categorical imperative. Is it so bad that we have used constitutional law to effect settlements that have, over time, excluded slave-owners, white supremacists, secessionists, and
would-be theocrats from our constitutional conversations?
Should all of our constitutional principles be subject to unsettlement? Seidman would probably argue that unsettlement can
occur whether we wish it to or not. He might also point to repeated caveats that unsettlement only gives others the opportunity to unsettle. (p. 9) Yet if certain issues (secession, slavery, de
jure racial discrimination) have been "settled," or at least if most
people believe they have been, then the opportunity to unsettle
that Seidman holds out to opponents of those settlements looks
to be cold comfort. It is unclear whether an illusory remedy to
losers of political settlements will be sufficient to retain their
loyalty.
There are other problems with unsettlement theory that
would likely surface in practice. As mentioned above, I did not
come away with any idea how a judicial decision could at once
decide a case, yet embrace the open-texture of the law, all while
providing useful precedent for the law's continuing development. In addition, Seidman never addresses how unsettlement
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theory could work in a hierarchical court system. Though he
talks about the role of "the courts" and of "judges," he really
seems to mean the "Supreme Court" and "Justices." While
Seidman is not alone among constitutional theorists to shortchange the role federal and state courts play in implementing
constitutional decisions, the omission of consideration in the
context of unsettlement theory is glaring.
Whatever the fate of constitutional settlement in the Supreme Court, lower courts must implement the Court's decisions
and apply them to the myriad fact situations that make up the
workaday docket of the district courts and the courts of appeals.
At that level, lawyers and clients do expect a settlement of their
case. If the Supreme Court eschews attempts at settlement for
"fuzzier" opinions, the likely result is that lower courts forced to
implement such decisions will minimize their significance and
simply rely on the legal status quo. Evidence from the lower
courts' post-Lopez Commerce Clause decisions bears this out. 15
Moreover, by repeatedly admonishing lower courts that any
overruling of Supreme Court precedent should be left to the
Court itself, the Supreme Court has limited lower courts' ability
to anticipate or fully implement successful unsettlement opinions
issued by the Court. 16
The difficulty that the lower courts judges have had implementing Lopez, even after clarifying opinions in United States v.
Morrison and United States v. Jones, raises another important
question that Seidman does not address: the institutional competence of courts at all levels to embrace and implement unsettlement theoryY Successful implementation of unsettlement theory
would require judges to abandon two cherished articles of professional faith- that courts settle matters by deciding cases and
that they do so by applying the law objectively, while recognizing
that legal principles are sometimes incomplete-in favor of a decisionmaking process that could be perceived as more politicized. It is questionable whether judges could embrace the law's
open texture and admit the contestability of legal principles
15. See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning and Glenn H. Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance:
The New Commerce Clause Jurisprudence Encounters the Lower Courts, 55 Ark. L. Rev.
1255 (2003); Glenn H. Reynolds and Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings of Lopez, or What If the Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution, and Nobody Came?,
2000 Wise. L. Rev. 369.
16. Denning and Reynolds, 55 Ark. L. Rev. at 1305-08 (cited in note 15).
17. See Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions,_
Mich. L. Rev. 885, 932-46 (2003) (testing theories of interpretation by reference to the
institutional capacities of courts to implement them successfully).
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without effecting a major change in the way American courts
operated, and, more important, without affecting public perception of the judiciary's role in our system of government.
In fact, unsettlement theory, as described by Seidman, may
have embedded in it the potential to undo itself. Recall that
Seidman defended the role of the judiciary with reference to
judges' unique position in our political system. They are public
officials who render written opinions in controversies making
them somewhat publicly accountable. The power is further tempered by the fact that they settle disputes at the retail level,
rather than at wholesale (like the legislature), according to a
professional ethos of disinterestedness I described above. However, judges are also able to preserve their independence and
their privacy because of the manner in which they are selected
and their lifetime tenure (for federal judges anyway).
If judges embrace Seidman's call to reject claims to objectivity and treat all legal principles as contestable, all settlements as
temporary, and all claims to neutrality as mere pretension, then
one wonders how long judges will be able to straddle the publicprivate divide. If the public (and other politicians) see judges as
performing a task that requires little or no specialized knowledge-one not very different from the role elected officials perform, it seems that the case for the judicial privileges deemed essential to the judicial independence, like the selection process
and the lifetime tenure, is substantially weakened. 18

VI
Still, I think that Seidman's contribution to the debate is an
important one. He asks the right questions: what does constitutional law do, exactly, in our system? What should it do? Though
I have doubts about making inclusiveness the overriding value in
our constitutional system, I think that Seidman is on to something when he suggests that providing political losers the opportunity to challenge settlements in court is an important function
that constitutional law performs. It follows, then, that we ought
to leave access to that avenue for change open to as many persons as possible, and that courts ought to give their constitu-

. 18. The present battles over the staffing of the courts of appeals may provide a preview of what would happen at every level should JUdges adopt the role that Seidman's
unsettlement theory envisions.
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tional arguments a respectful hearing, even if the arguments are
ultimately rejected.
As Seidman points out, the fact that the extent of the Second Amendment's protection of private gun ownership has
never been settled by the Supreme Court means that both proponents and opponents of gun control can invoke the Amendment to support their contradictory positions. This may ensure,
as he feels, that "the very guns receiving uncertain Second
Amendment protection will never be used to settle our political
disputes." 19 (p. 209) Seidman's work comes as a welcome reminder that courts are often the last hope for our most marginalized and alienated citizens. When they resort to litigation to vindicate what they see as their constitutional rights, judges (and
scholars) ought to afford them a fair hearing-and not label their
arguments as "crazy" or "fringe." One might even argue that the
more out-of-the-mainstream the legal argument, the more time a
judge or scholar ought to spend trying to explain where the argument goes off track.
Moreover, his skepticism about the ability of theorists and
courts to effect final, unalterable constitutional settlements, and
about their value (assuming settlement is even possible), is refreshing after a decades-long quest for a unified theory of constitutional law that could produce answers to all of our constitutional questions. 20 Even a reader who takes issue with Seidman's
theoretical prescriptions would be hard-pressed to disagree with
his argument that judges and scholars should not uncritically accept constitutional law's familiar categories (freedom vs. coercion, feasance vs. nonfeasance, etc.) and should be aware that at-

19. I am reminded of a similar observation of Alexander Bickel's comment about
winning the Pentagon Papers case. After the case, he wrote,
the conditions in which government will not be allowed to restrain publication
are now clearer and perhaps more stringent than they have been. We are, or at
least we feel, freer when we feel no need to extend our freedom. The conflict
and contention by which we extend freedom seem to mark, or at least to
threaten, a contradiction; and in truth they do, for they endanger an assumed
freedom which appeared limitless because its limits were untried. Appearance
and reality are nearly one. We extend the legal reality of freedom at some cost
in its limitless appearance. And the cost is real.
Alexander M. Bickel, The Morality of Consent 61 (Yale U. Press, 1975). In other words,
an additional disadvantage of having settled, bright·line rules is that they encourage
regulation right up to the legal limit. Those regulations might never have issu.ed prior to
settlement, because of legal uncertainty.
20. See Daniel A. Farber and Suzanna Sherry, Desperately Seeking Certainty: The
Misguided Quest for Constitutional Foundations (U. of Chicago Press, 2002) (describing
the efforts of liberal and conservative scholars in the 1980s and 1990s to produce such
meta-theories).

2002]

BOOK REVIEWS

793

tempts at constitutional settlement are as subject to the law of
unintended consequences as any other human endeavor.
The lack of final answers in constitutional law, and the provisional nature even of "landmark" Supreme Court cases tends
to make the American political and legal culture robust. This robust nature, in turn, may render both resistant to the decay and
corruption that accompany the apathy and torpor that Seidman
see as debilitating for democracies. Seidman writes:
Healthy political communities are not fixed and static, and
they do not have things worked out. Their past, as well as
their future, is not settled. Instead, they are constantly reinventing their own histories and meanings .... Political community is maintained precisely because there is no permanent
settlement and, indeed, no exclusive, agreed-upon method for
amending temporary settlements. Instead, the community is
built upon an endless battle, with no fixed rules and no hope
of final resolution.Z 1 (p. 55)

Others have urged scholars to be more modest in their aims
when writing about constitutional law in hopes of remaking it,
Seidman's book furnishes a complementary caution that those
who make constitutional law should similarly be modest about
their ability to settle highly contested matters on constitutional
grounds so tha't constitutional amendment is the only avenue left
to the losing party. The inability of the U.S. Supreme Court to
settle the issue of slavery (Dred Scott v. Sanford), abortion (Roe
v. Wade), or public prayer (Engle v. Vitale), and the fact that the
Court emerged from each attempt somewhat worse for wear
suggests that there is wisdom in Seidman's counsel.

21. See also Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Is Democracy Like Sex?, 48 Vand. L. Rev.
1635 (1995).

